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Abstract
To understand the e⁄ects of regulation on mortgage risk, it is instructive to track
the history of regulatory changes in a country rather than to rely entirely on cross-
country evidence that can be contaminated by unobserved heterogeneity. However,
in developed countries with fairly stable systems of ￿nancial regulation, it is di¢ cult
to track these e⁄ects. We employ loan-level data on over a million loans disbursed in
India over the 1995 to 2010 period to understand how fast-changing regulation impacted
mortgage lending and risk. We ￿nd evidence that regulation has important e⁄ects on
mortgage rates and delinquencies in both the time-series and the cross-section.
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How does mortgage regulation in￿ uence the structure and performance of housing ￿nance?
This paper answers the question by analyzing administrative data on over 1.2 million loans
originated by an Indian mortgage provider, relating loan pricing and delinquency rates to
the changing details of Indian mortgage regulation.
A more common approach to this question is to compare mortgage systems across coun-
tries. Casual observation reveals striking cross-country di⁄erences. A recent survey by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF 2011) shows that among developed countries, homeown-
ership rates range from 43% in Germany to about 80% in southern European countries. The
level of mortgage debt in relation to GDP varies from 22% in Italy to above 100% in Denmark
and the Netherlands. The terms of mortgage instruments are overwhelmingly adjustable-
rate in southern Europe, and ￿xed-rate in the United States. Mortgages are funded using a
wide variety of mechanisms, including deposit-￿nanced lending, mortgage-backed securities,
and covered bonds.
Government involvement in mortgage markets also varies across countries, and it is likely
that this explains at least some of the cross-country variation in housing ￿nance. However,
it is hard to disentangle regulatory e⁄ects from other factors that may a⁄ect household
mortgage choice across countries, including historical experiences with interest rate and
in￿ ation volatility, which can have long-lasting e⁄ects because consumers can be slow to
adopt new ￿nancial instruments (Campbell 2012). An appealing alternative approach is
to trace the e⁄ects of mortgage regulation over time within a single country rather than
rely entirely on cross-country evidence that can be contaminated by unobserved di⁄erences
across countries. The di¢ culty in doing this is that developed countries tend to have fairly
stable systems of ￿nancial regulation, so one rarely has the opportunity to track the e⁄ects
of sharp regulatory changes. Slow changes, such as those that occurred in the US during
the early and mid-2000s, may well be important but it is hard to show this convincingly.
For this reason academic writers and public policy commentators have reached no consensus
on the degree to which regulation, rather than other factors, caused the US mortgage credit
1boom.1
Mortgages are rapidly becoming important ￿nancial instruments in emerging markets.
Here, ￿nancial regulation is at least as intrusive and much less stable. In addition, long-
lasting historical in￿ uences are likely to be less important in emerging markets because their
rapid growth and ￿nancial evolution reduce consumer inertia. For this reason, emerging
markets are ideal laboratories in which to examine the e⁄ects of mortgage regulation. How-
ever emerging markets pose a di⁄erent challenge, that of ￿nding adequate data. Many
questions about mortgage ￿nance can only be answered using microeconomic data, either at
the household level or the loan level. There is now a vast literature looking at such data
in the US, but it is harder to ￿nd in less wealthy countries with rapidly changing ￿nancial
systems.2
This paper uses high-quality microeconomic data to study the mortgage market in In-
dia, a large and complex emerging economy. India has been studied extensively by the
economics profession, which has mainly analyzed issues of poverty and development (see,
for example, Besley and Burgess, 2000, and Banerjee et al., 2007), or the impact of the
Byzantine system of laws and regulations on industrial organization and ￿rm output (see
Aghion et al., 2008, and von Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee, and Visaria, 2012 for example).
India underwent an economic liberalization in the early 1990s and subsequently experienced
rapid economic growth that accelerated further in the 2000s. During this time the ￿nancial
sector has become much larger and more sophisticated, but remains highly regulated, with a
signi￿cantly nationalized banking sector. It is only very recently that authors (for a recent
example see Anagol and Kim, 2012) have begun to study India in the context of ￿nancial
regulation and its impacts on fast-changing Indian capital markets. The provision of housing
￿nance is evolving particularly rapidly (Tiwari and Debata 2008, Verma 2012). Regulatory
1A range of views can be found in Acharya, Richardson, van Nieuwerburgh, and White (2011), Baily
(2011), Ellis (2008), International Monetary Fund (2011), and US Treasury and Department of Housing and
Urban Development (2011), among other sources.
2Some recent mortgage studies using US microeconomic data include Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2009),
Agarwal et al (2011), Amromin et al (2011), Bhutta, Dokko, and Shan (2010), Demyanyk and van Hemert
(2011), Foote et al (2010), Johnson and Li (2011), Keys et al (2010), Melzer (2011), Mian and Su￿ (2009),
and Piskorski, Seru, and Vig (2011).
2norms have changed frequently, albeit with a continuing emphasis on funding housing for
low-income households. There is increased competition between mortgage lenders, and this
may have contributed to rapidly increasing house prices since 2002. Indian mortgages in-
clude both ￿xed and variable rate loans, but there has been a signi￿cant shift over time
towards the latter.
We are fortunate to have access to loan-level administrative data from an Indian mortgage
provider. We analyze over 1.2 million mortgages disbursed by the mortgage provider between
1995 and 2010, and attempt to understand both the macroeconomic and microeconomic
determinants of mortgage rate setting and delinquencies. These data reveal three interesting
￿ndings which relate regulation to mortgage risk. First, simple plots reveal a signi￿cant spike
in delinquencies in the early 2000s. When we estimate a model which relates delinquencies
to demographic information, loan characteristics, and macroeconomic shocks, we ￿nd that
even after controlling for these determinants, the spike in delinquencies shows up in the
cohort e⁄ects for loans issued in those years. We connect these estimated cohort e⁄ects
to a number of regulatory changes which encouraged mortgage lending at that time, and
we regard this as strong, albeit circumstantial evidence for regulatory e⁄ects on mortgage
defaults.
Second, in addition to this time-series evidence on aggregate mortgage default rates, we
provide evidence on the impacts of regulation from the cross-section of defaults conditioned
on various loan attributes. In particular, throughout the period of study, small and micro
loans are particularly favoured by the Indian regulatory environment. We uncover evidence
that the implicit subsidies to such loans show up in a higher propensity for them to default
than can be accounted for by their mortgage rates at issuance and all other determinants in
the model. This tendency is highly statistically signi￿cant, is greater for micro loans than
for small loans just under the subsidy-qualifying threshold, and is observed in all cohorts
of loan issuance over the sample period. We also ￿nd that the magnitude of the excess
delinquency propensity of small and micro loans appears to vary over time in a way that can
be connected to the tightness of the constraint favoring these loans.
Third, we ￿nd a signi￿cant and somewhat abrupt decline in three-month payment delin-
3quencies beginning in early 2004. We connect this ￿nding to the fact that the regulatory
de￿nition of ￿non-performing assets,￿a de￿nition which is associated with provisioning re-
quirements against such delinquent loans, changes in March 2004, from previously referring
to loans that are six-months delinquent to those that are three-months delinquent. Follow-
ing this change, we ￿nd that one-month delinquent loans are far less likely to subsequently
become three-months delinquent. Furthermore, using a subsample of 10,000 loans for which
we have a complete time-series of payment histories, we uncover evidence that is consistent
with more e⁄ort on the part of the mortgage provider to monitor delinquencies in response
to this regulatory change. In particular, we ￿nd that debt collection rates on one-month
delinquent loans are accelerated in the interval before they hit the new three-month mark
for classi￿cation as a non-performing asset. Importantly, perhaps as a result of incentivizing
mortgage lenders to act early on delinquent loans, we ￿nd that this change substantially low-
ers the likelihood of experiencing longer-term defaults. This impact on long-term defaults
is even larger than that arising from a 2002 legal change in the ability of mortgage providers
to more easily repossess or restructure non-performing assets.
Taken together, these three ￿ndings provide compelling evidence that regulatory norms
impact the risk of delinquencies experienced by our Indian mortgage provider on loans issued.
Our evidence complements recent ￿ndings using U.S. data on the impacts of regulatory norms
on mortgage screening (Keys et al. 2011), and is also related to work on how mortgage credit
expansion in the U.S., particularly in sub-prime zipcodes, contributed to the recent crisis
(Mian and Su￿ 2009). Our model shows that controlling for a range of determinants of
mortgage risk, the time when a loan is issued has signi￿cant explanatory power, a ￿nding
related to the analysis of Demyanyk and van Hemert (2011) who perform a similar analysis
to explain U.S. sub-prime mortgage risk. Finally, our ￿ndings are relevant to the suggestion
of Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2008) that capital requirements against risk-weighted assets
should be countercyclically adjusted. We ￿nd that a reduction in the risk-weight on housing
￿nance following a period of low GDP growth is associated with high levels of mortgage
delinquencies for loans issued in those cohorts, implying that Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein￿ s
policy can in￿ uence the riskiness of mortgage lending.
4The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets the stage by describing the
Indian macroeconomic environment over our period of study, the mortgage data that we
employ, and the Indian system of mortgage regulation. Further details on that system are
provided in an online regulatory appendix (Campbell, Ramadorai, and Balasubramaniam
2012). Section 3 introduces our model of mortgage delinquencies, which we use to show
that changing demographic characteristics of borrowers, loan characteristics, or estimated
macro shocks cannot fully explain the high delinquency rate in the early 2000s. Instead,
changing regulation to encourage mortgage lending appears to be responsible. Section 4
presents evidence that regulation has also a⁄ected the relative pricing of small and large
mortgages, and discusses the change in the regulatory de￿nition of non-performing assets
in 2004 and its consequences on observed delinquency and repayment patterns. Section 5
concludes. Additional empirical evidence on the Indian mortgage market is reported in an
online empirical appendix (Campbell, Ramadorai, and Ranish 2012).
2 The Macroeconomic and Regulatory Environment
2.1 Macroeconomic and Mortgage Finance Trends
To set the stage, Table 1 illustrates the history of several important macroeconomic variables
over the past quarter-century in India, including annual real GDP growth, CPI in￿ ation,
and government bond yields. Regulatory and macroeconomic reform in the early 1990s was
followed by growth in the 4-8% range until the early 2000s, when growth accelerated above
8%, brie￿ y slowed again only by the global ￿nancial crisis in 2008. Meanwhile in￿ ation was
high and volatile during the 1990s, with volatility particularly elevated around the reform
period and in 1998￿ 99. A period of more stable in￿ ation followed in the 2000s, but in￿ ation
accelerated at the very end of our sample period.
Indian government bond yields over the same period are also quite volatile. The 1-year
yield declines from double-digit levels in the mid-1990s, with considerable volatility in the
late 1990s related to the volatile in￿ ation experienced at the same time. After a low of
5about 5% in the early 2000s, the 1-year yield spikes up in 2008, again related to concerns
about in￿ ation. The 10-year yield is smoother but also undergoes a large decline from the
mid-1990s until the early 2000s.
Figure 1 plots house price indexes, both for India as a whole and for ￿ve broad regions.
We compute the indexes using the mortgage provider￿ s own property cost data, but data
from the National Housing Bank (NHB) show similar patterns. Indian house prices were
relatively stable until the early 2000s and then began to increase rapidly, particularly in the
south of the country. The southern index peaks in 2008 while some other regions peak in
2009. Thus India took part in the worldwide housing boom despite many di⁄erences in
other aspects of its macroeconomic performance.
Over this same period, the Indian mortgage market was experiencing rapid change. Fig-
ure 2 illustrates one aspect of this change, namely a shift from a predominantly ￿xed-rate
mortgage system to one that is dominated by variable-rate lending. The ￿gure plots the
share of variable-rate loans in total issuance by our mortgage provider. Starting at about
40% of dollar value in the mid-1990s, the variable-rate share increases above 90% by the
early 2000s, then brie￿ y dips to 60% in 2004 before again rising and reaching 100% by the
end of our sample period. The cause of the brief shift back towards ￿xed-rate mortgages in
2004 is an interesting question that we discuss later in the paper.
Figure 3 plots the delinquency rate (the fraction of mortgages that are 90 days past due),
seasonally adjusted using a regression on monthly dummies, for both ￿xed-rate mortgages
(solid line) and variable-rate mortgages (dashed line). The main feature of this ￿gure is a
large spike in delinquencies in 2002￿ 03, particularly for ￿xed-rate mortgages. This spike
is one of the features of the data that we attempt to explain using our model, which we
introduce in the next section. Delinquencies decline to quite low levels by 2005, and remain
low to the end of our sample period despite the weak housing market in 2009￿ 10.
Table 2 shows how our mortgage lender responded to the market conditions described
above. Panel A reports cross-sectional means of mortgage terms and delinquency rates.
Initial interest rates on variable-rate and ￿xed-rate mortgages track one another very closely
until 2002, and are both close to the Indian prime rate shown in Table 1, despite some
6variation in the spread between long-term and short-term government yields. In the period
2003￿ 06, the variable mortgage rate is well above the ￿xed rate and has an unusually high
spread over the 1-year bond yield, a feature shared with the Indian prime rate. This period
has a generally high market share for variable mortgages, but does include the episode in 2004
when our mortgage lender shifted back towards ￿xed mortgage issuance. Variable mortgage
rates decline after 2008, a period where ￿xed mortgages have essentially disappeared from
our dataset.
The right-hand column reports the cohort 90-day delinquency rate, the annual probability
that an outstanding and not-yet-delinquent loan experiences a 90-day delinquency, calculated
separately for each disbursal-year cohort and calendar year, and then averaged over calendar
years for each cohort. The early 2000s appear unusual in the sense that the cohort default
rate for mortgages disbursed in these years is high relative to the other cohorts in the
sample period, despite loan characteristics such as loan-to-cost and loan-to-income ratios
not changing much on average. The 2004 cohort, especially for ￿xed rate loans, however,
appears to have a signi￿cantly reduced default rate, which we connect to the spike in ￿xed
rate issuance later in the paper.
Panel B of Table 2 shows the cross-sectional standard deviation of loan characteristics
and initial interest rates. In the early 2000s there is a large spike in the cross-sectional
dispersion of variable mortgage rates. This spike coincides with the period of increased
delinquencies documented earlier, and may re￿ ect increased e⁄orts by our mortgage lender
to distinguish among borrowers by estimating their default risk and setting mortgage rates
accordingly. For ￿xed mortgage rates, while the same pattern is not evident in the cross-
sectional dispersion of initial interest rates, there does seem to be an increase in the early
2000s in the cross-sectional dispersion of loan-to-cost ratios, which reduces again in 2004.
In the remainder of this paper, we relate several of the summary statistics described
above to changes in the Indian regulatory environment for housing ￿nance. Our empirical
work requires a basic understanding of the regulatory structure in India, to which we now
turn.
72.2 The Regulatory Environment
Mortgages in India are originated by two types of ￿nancial institutions, banks and housing
￿nance companies (HFCs). Banks are regulated by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), while
housing ￿nance companies are regulated by the National Housing Bank (NHB), but most
regulations apply in fairly similar form to the two types of institution. This fact is important
for our study, as we are unable to publicly identify whether our mortgage provider is a bank
or an HFC.
Figure 4 summarizes the details of mortgage regulation in India in a relatively parsimo-
nious fashion. The top half of the ￿gure shows regulations that applied to banks, and the
bottom half to HFCs. The regulations that remained constant throughout the period are
listed in black, whereas the ones that changed over the period are in colored font. In light
of the signi￿cant changes that took place from 2001 to 2002, we separate the timeline into
the ￿￿rst period,￿i.e. prior to March 2001, and the ￿second period￿which extends from
April 2001 until the end of the sample period. In the middle of the ￿gure, we summarize
subsidy schemes for micro-lending with the length of the bars accompanying these schemes
identifying their start and end dates relative to the timeline.
Regulations can be divided into two types: those that restrict the funding of mortgage
lending, and those that incentivize lending to favored borrowers. Until 2001, mortgage
funding was regulated in a fairly traditional manner, using leverage restrictions on banks
and HFCs, and interest-rate ceilings on deposit-taking HFCs. From 2002 onwards, these
measures were augmented by capital requirements against risk-weighted assets following
the internationally standard Basel II framework. The RBI and NHB distinguished small
and large loans, and loan-to-value (LTV) ratios above and below 75%, and set di⁄erent risk
weights for these di⁄erent categories with frequent changes for loans below 75% LTV. In this
way the regulators shifted the risk capital available to banks and HFCs, and the incentives
for aggressive mortgage origination.
Another noteworthy change in the regulatory environment is highlighted on the timeline,
and occurred on March 31, 2004 for banks, and one year later, i.e., March 31, 2005 for HFCs.
8At this time the RBI rede￿ned an asset as a ￿non-performing asset￿(or NPA) if payments
(on interest or principal) remained overdue for a period of ninety days or more, from the
previous 180 day period allowed before assets were so classi￿ed. One important implication
of the classi￿cation of an asset as an NPA is that it incurs provisioning requirements, meaning
that the capital available to a mortgage lender holding such an asset reduces as the lender
is required to hold precautionary capital to cover expected losses. Related to this NPA
rede￿nition, an important law which came into force in July 2002, also highlighted on the
timeline, was the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement
of Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act. This law enabled the easier recovery of NPAs via
securitization, reconstruction, or direct repossession, bypassing the need for secured creditors
to seek permission from debt recovery tribunals (see von Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee, and
Visaria, 2012, for evidence of the impacts of the establishment of these tribunals in 1993). In
our analysis, we separately evaluate the impact of these two changes, namely the rede￿nition
of NPAs in 2004, and the introduction of SARFAESI in 2002, on delinquencies experienced
by the mortgage provider.
Lending to small borrowers is an important political goal in India. Banks are subject to a
quantity target for Priority-Sector Lending (PSL), which includes loans to agriculture, small
businesses, export credit, a¢ rmative action lending, educational loans, and ￿of particular
interest to us ￿mortgages for low-cost housing. The PSL target is 40% of net bank credit
for domestic banks (32% for foreign banks), and there is a severe ￿nancial penalty for failure
to meet the target, namely, compulsory lending to rural agriculture at a haircut to the repo
rate. This regulation does not directly apply to HFCs, but bank lending to an HFC quali￿es
for the PSL target to the extent that the HFC makes mortgage loans that qualify, i.e., are
below the speci￿ed nominal PSL threshold. The overall e⁄ect of the PSL system is to
provide a strong incentive, directly for banks, and indirectly for HFCs, to originate small
mortgages that ￿nance low-cost housing purchases.
In addition to the PSL system, other schemes have been introduced at various points in
time over the sample period to subsidize new or re￿nanced micro-lending ￿i.e., loans of sizes
well below the PSL-qualifying threshold. The mid-section of Figure 4 shows the various
9schemes that were in place to incentivize mortgage lending in very small loan sizes. These
schemes apply to both banks and HFCs. Most recently, interest rate subventions have been
put in place for the ￿rst year of repayments on small loans, payments that are passed through
to the borrower in the form of a reduced interest rate, for housing loans up to a maximum
size. Special subsidy and re￿nancing schemes in place for very small rural loans (the Golden
Jubilee Rural Housing Finance Scheme or GJRHFS, and the Indira Awas Yojana) and for
borrowers qualifying for a¢ rmative action (the Di⁄erential Rate of Interest scheme) are also
shown in the ￿gure, over the period for which they applied. Taken together, these schemes
increase the subsidy for tiny loans over and above the standard subsidy to PSL-qualifying
loans.
As is evident from the brief description above, it is not a trivial task to document the
changes in the system of Indian mortgage regulation as these have been frequent, and are
not summarized in any one place. The online regulatory appendix to this paper, Campbell,
Ramadorai, and Balasubramaniam (2012), provides further details about the regulatory
system.
3 A Model of Mortgage Delinquencies
In this section we attempt to shed light on the factors which contributed to changes in
the mortgage delinquency rate over time and across cohorts, paying special attention to
the changing regulations described in the previous section. In order to do so, we propose
and estimate a model of mortgage delinquencies, recognizing that their determinants include
demographic characteristics of borrowers, measurable characteristics of loans, cohort-speci￿c
variation, and (imperfectly observable) variation in macroeconomic conditions.
We model the probability of observing a delinquency as a function of all of these deter-
minants:
Pr[￿i;c;b;t] = (￿ + ￿c + ￿b + ￿k￿kLikt + ￿j￿jDijt + ￿ri;c;b)Zt￿1 + e
￿
i;c;b;t; (1)
10where ￿i;c;b;t is an indicator for an observed 90-day delinquency in loan i in cohort c originated
in branch b, at time t. That is, c denotes the loan origination date and t denotes the
delinquency date. The model includes ￿xed e⁄ects for branches, ￿b, and cohorts, ￿c (in
each case, we drop one dummy as we have an intercept in the model). It also includes loan
characteristics Likt indexed by k, and demographic characteristics Dijt indexed by j, for each
borrower i. These characteristics can potentially vary over time, although in practice most
of the ones we measure are constant over time. The initial interest rate on the mortgage,
ri;c;b is also included as an explanatory variable in the model.3
Finally, the model allows for an unobserved macroeconomic shock Zt￿1 to impact these
determinants multiplicatively. Thus the estimated coe¢ cients on the branch and cohort
￿xed e⁄ects, loan and demographic characteristics show the extent to which these factors
alter the propensity for a loan to default as macro conditions vary. To ￿x ideas, consider a
high estimated value of a particular cohort e⁄ect ￿this would indicate a high propensity of
loans in that cohort to default when times are bad, i.e., when Zt￿1 is high. The choice of
Zt￿1 rather than Zt as the macroeconomic shock in￿ uencing delinquency at time t captures
the fact that 90-day delinquencies are not realized contemporaneously with deteriorations
in macroeconomic circumstances. Rather, we expect to see delinquencies materialize some
period of time after negative macroeconomic shocks, as delinquencies result from borrower-
level cash-￿ ow problems, which likely occur with a lag.
We estimate the model separately for ￿xed-rate and variable-rate loans, employing a two-
stage estimation procedure, in which the ￿rst stage comprises T cross-sectional regressions
estimated across all loans outstanding, and not yet delinquent, in each year t 2 T. In
the second stage, we employ the classical minimum distance estimator (see, for example,
Wooldridge (2002)) to extract estimates of Zt and the static parameters of the model. As
a check on our procedure, we con￿rm that two-stage estimation produces estimates that are
very close to those obtained via single-step estimation using non-linear least squares. To
3The model is estimated at the annual frequency t; to eliminate monthly variation, we de-mean all left-
and right-hand side variables at the monthly frequency and add back the annual mean. This change is
innocuous, having little impact on our results.
11obtain standard errors for the second stage estimates we use a cross-sectional correlation
consistent bootstrap procedure, in which we draw a set of time periods equal to the total
number of years (15) in our data t1
b;:::;t15
b 2 T with replacement, and assemble a simulated
dataset for each bootstrap draw b. We then re-run the second stage regressions for b = 500
draws.
The demographic variables that we employ include the borrower￿ s gender, marital status,
number of dependents, and dummies for age (up to age 35, 36-45, and 46 and above), for ed-
ucation (high-school measured by higher-secondary certi￿cate or HSC, college, postgraduate,
and missing), for a ￿nance-related educational quali￿cation, and for a repeat borrower. The
loan characteristics include the log loan-to-cost ratio, log loan-to-income ratio, a piecewise
linear function of log loan size in relation to the PSL threshold (discussed in more detail
later in the paper), dummies for origination branch, dummies for whether the loan was paid
by salary deduction or via a special scheme with the employer, as well as dummies for spe-
cial loan characteristics (tranched issuances and re￿nancings), speci￿c loan purposes (home
extension or improvement), and mortgage contract terms (loan maturities 6-10 years, 11-15
years, or 16 years and above). To control for house-price movements, we also include in the
set of loan characteristics regional house-price appreciation up to time t from the time of the
disbursal of the loan. For variable-rate loans only, we control for the change in the 1-year
Indian government bond yield since issuance. Finally, we include a dummy variable which
takes the value of 1 if a loan is disbursed from a branch in the 12 months prior to a state
election, to capture the possibility (documented by Cole 2009 for Indian agricultural lending)
that in election seasons there may be pressure to disburse politically expedient loans, which
have a higher propensity to be delinquent.
3.1 Regulation and Delinquencies: Time-Series Evidence
Table 3 shows the estimated coe¢ cients on the demographic and loan characteristics from
equation (1), which predominantly appear to have signs consistent with intuition about
their likely impacts on delinquencies. For the sake of brevity, Table 3 does not present the
12estimated macroeconomic shocks and cohort e⁄ects with associated standard errors, but we
present these in the online empirical appendix (Campbell, Ramadorai, and Ranish 2012).
We do plot these series, however, in Figures 5 and 6.
Figure 5 plots the estimated macroeconomic shocks Zt. Our estimates are weighted by
the relative fractions of ￿xed and variable rate loan issuance from the separate speci￿cations
that we estimate for these two types of loans, a strategy that we continue to adopt in
the remaining ￿gures in the paper in order to conserve space. The ￿gure also shows two
di⁄erent measures of macroeconomic conditions: real GDP growth, and the average real
rate of growth in corporate sales, ￿rm ￿xed assets, and ￿rm net worth estimated from the
population of Indian ￿rms available in the Prowess database.4 The ￿gure, in which all series
are standardized for ease of comparison, shows that estimated Zt seems closely, although not
perfectly related to these other measures. All three measures indicate that 2002 and 2003
were periods of particularly poor macroeconomic conditions, with a complete recovery in the
Indian macro environment only by 2005.
Figure 6 shows how delinquencies vary by their cohort of issuance. The series that we
plot in this ￿gure is the sum of cohort average ￿tted values on borrower and loan character-
istics (￿hard information￿ ), and the estimated cohort e⁄ects from the model (￿+￿c) (￿soft
information￿which is unobservable to the econometrician), again weighted by loan issuance
across ￿xed and variable rate loans. The bars plotted in the ￿gure capture the e⁄ect of
being issued in a particular year on the delinquency propensity of loans in the sample, after
controlling for macroeconomic shocks.5 The ￿gure shows that the spike in the delinquency
rate seen in 2002, 2003, and 2004 is connected to loan issuance cohort, not only to prevailing
macroeconomic circumstances in these years.
4This database comprises the population of listed and large unlisted Indian ￿rms, and is considered to
be the main source of information on Indian corporates (see, for example, von Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee,
and Visaria, 2012).
5Note that the estimation of the cohort e⁄ects already controls for variation in interest rates at the loan
level. We also estimate a version of equation (1) in which we replace the interest rate at issuance with
the spread over the one-year Indian government bond yield (in the case of variable-rate loans) or ten-year
government bond yield (in the case of ￿xed-rate loans). The resulting ￿gure is presented in the online
empirical appendix, and is similar to Figure 6, although somewhat noisier because Indian mortgage rates do
not move closely with government bond yields, which are therefore an imperfect benchmark.
13Figure 7 takes this analysis a step further. We separately plot the (demeaned) hard and
soft information components of the total cohort e⁄ect shown in Figure 6. We superimpose
two lines that summarize relevant changes in the regulatory environment for both banks and
HFCs. The solid line shows the interest-rate ceiling applied to deposits issued by HFCs
minus the yield on one-year Indian Government bonds. This spread is multiplied by ￿ve for
scaling purposes and its scale is shown on the right vertical axis. From 1997 until 2001 there
was no interest-rate ceiling, but a ceiling was reintroduced in 2002 and slightly tightened
in 2003 and again in 2004. Both hard and soft information components of cohort-level
variation in delinquencies steadily increase during the period with no interest-rate ceiling,
i.e., the absence of an interest-rate ceiling is associated with steadily increasing delinquency
rates, presumably from the looser funding constraint. While this is consistent with the view
that a relatively unrestricted supply of credit to HFCs in this period stimulated lending, with
delayed consequences for default, this must be viewed with the caveat that we are unable to
publicly identify whether our mortgage provider is a bank or an HFC. Mian and Su￿(2009)
present a similar view of developments in the US during the 2000s.
The other, dashed line in Figure 7 summarizes changing risk weights for housing loans,
following their introduction in April 2001, constructed by averaging the risk weights that
apply to banks and to HFCs for loans with less than 0.75 LTV, and scaled as shown on the
right vertical axis. The ￿gure plots (100% - Risk Weight), as a measure of the looseness of
the restriction on lending. The loosening of the risk weight restriction in 2002, 2003, and
2004 coincides precisely with the increased delinquency rates attributable to soft information
in those years, and a subsequent tightening of the risk weight restriction in 2005 and 2006
coincides with unusually low values of the soft information component of delinquencies. In
2005 and 2006, however, there is an increase in the level of delinquencies attributable to hard
information, which partially o⁄sets the decline in the soft information component, leading to
a relatively mild decline in cohort-level delinquencies especially in 2005. The online empirical
appendix shows that the growth of aggregate HFC and bank housing credit spikes up in 2005
and 2006, suggesting that competition between Indian ￿nancial institutions may be another
factor to consider for a complete understanding of these patterns. Finally, in 2004, despite
14continued loose risk weight restrictions, the soft information component is slightly lower than
its level in 2003, and we connect this to the shift away from variable-rate to ￿xed-rate loans
by the mortgage provider ￿the online empirical appendix plots the cohort e⁄ects separately
for ￿xed and variable loans, and shows that the soft information component of the 2004
cohort e⁄ect is relatively lower for ￿xed-rate loans than for variable-rate loans.
In sum, while one must always be cautious about the interpretation of any pure time-series
correlation, Figure 7 suggests that changes in regulation are an important factor driving the
aggregate delinquency patterns in our data.
4 Regulation and Delinquencies: Cross-Sectional
Evidence
4.1 The E⁄ect of Priority Sector Lending Norms
Risk weights and interest rate ceilings are not the only regulatory instruments through
which the Reserve Bank of India a⁄ects mortgage lending and risk. Priority-sector lending
(PSL) norms also exist and have cross-sectional e⁄ects, diverting lending towards favored
small loans. They do this both through the RBI￿ s quantity targets for banks, and currently,
through interest-rate subventions for loans up to a certain size. If PSL norms are important,
they might induce mortgage lenders to make riskier loans to small borrowers.
Table 4 presents statistics on the importance of priority-sector lending by our mort-
gage provider, showing the fraction of loan value issued below the prevailing nominal PSL-
qualifying threshold in each year from 1995 to 2010. For variable rate loans, this fraction
declines from roughly 70% in the early years of our sample to 33% in 2010. Micro-loans
(which we classify very simply as those smaller than one-half of the PSL-qualifying threshold)
account for between a third and a little more than a half of the total set of PSL-qualifying
variable rate loan issuance. For ￿xed rate loans, the fraction of PSL-qualifying loans in
total issuance by value ￿ uctuates between 65% and 85%, with a sharp reduction in 2004 to
48% of total loan issuance. This reduction in 2004, when combined with the lower ￿xed
15rate cohort e⁄ect in that year which we refer to in the previous section, suggest that the
mortgage provider reduced its reliance on these (potentially more risky) loans in 2004.
Of course, mortgage lenders might make risky small loans in the absence of any regulatory
incentives, if they are able to charge higher mortgage rates to compensate for the higher risk
(Duca and Rosenthal 1994). As a ￿rst simple way to evaluate whether loans below the PSL
qualifying threshold are riskier even after controlling for mortgage rates, Table 3 allows for
separate slopes for loan sizes above and below the PSL threshold at loan disbursal when
estimating equation (1). If subsidies are responsible for the relationship between loan size
and the propensity to be delinquent, then the slope below the PSL threshold should be
estimated to be negative and statistically signi￿cant, because as we know from Figure 4,
there are additional subsidies for micro-lending at loan sizes well below the PSL threshold.
However, there should be no consistent relationship between loan size and the propensity to
be delinquent for loan sizes above the PSL-qualifying threshold.
Table 3 shows that indeed, for loans below the PSL threshold, loan size has a substantial
and statistically signi￿cant negative e⁄ect on the propensity for a loan to be delinquent.
However, above the PSL-qualifying threshold, while there is a small and marginally statis-
tically signi￿cant negative slope estimated for variable rate loans (roughly one-￿fth the size
of the slope below the threshold), the slope is small, positive and marginally statistically
signi￿cant for ￿xed rate loans. We view this as evidence that the PSL subsidy distorts the
e¢ cient-market relationship between interest rates and delinquencies, and that loans below
the PSL-qualifying threshold are riskier than those above it.
The negative slope below the PSL-qualifying threshold suggests that micro-loans (i.e.,
those well below the PSL-qualifying threshold) are even riskier than those just below the
threshold. To evaluate the relative riskiness of di⁄erent loan sizes, we estimate a version
of equation (1) in which we interact the cohort e⁄ects with two dummy variables, the ￿rst
of which identi￿es whether a loan is below the PSL-qualifying threshold at the time it is
made, and the second which identi￿es whether a loan is below one-half the PSL-qualifying
threshold at the time it is made (this is to identify the impact of being a micro loan).
Table 5 shows the estimated unconditional mean and cohort e⁄ects (cohort-speci￿c de-
16viations from the unconditional mean) interacted with the size dummies from this model.
Panel A reports results for variable-rate mortgages, and panel B for ￿xed-rate mortgages.
The table reveals several interesting patterns. First, the probability of being delinquent
is far higher on average for PSL-qualifying and micro loans than for those above the PSL-
qualifying threshold. Second, there is an interesting time pattern to these cohort e⁄ects.
Figure 8 plots the excess delinquency propensity over non-subsidized loans in each cohort
(combining the unconditional mean and the cohort e⁄ect) for both PSL-qualifying and mi-
cro loans. Variable-rate and ￿xed-rate cohort e⁄ects are weighted by the issuance of each
type of mortgage. In every one of the cohort-years in the data, micro loans have a far
higher propensity to be delinquent, and PSL-qualifying loans also have a higher propensity
in every cohort-year except 1998. There is an interesting U-shaped pattern in these excess
propensities, that is, they are higher at the very beginning of the sample period, decreasing
in the late 1990s, and then increasing from roughly the middle of the sample period until
the end of the sample period.
We overlay two measures of the tightness of the PSL constraint in each cohort-year on
this plot. The ￿rst is the negative of the (log) ratio of the nominal PSL-qualifying threshold
de￿ ated by house price appreciation. The PSL-qualifying threshold is increased periodically,
and when it is raised by more than the increase in house prices, the constraint is e⁄ectively
looser. Conversely, if the PSL-qualifying threshold remains at the same nominal level when
house prices rise substantially, the constraint is more binding. The second measure tracks
the tightness of the PSL constraint by subtracting aggregate credit extended to the priority
sector by public sector banks, Indian private sector banks, and foreign banks operating in
India from the mandatory PSL lending requirement of these institutions. If more than the
mandatory amount of PSL credit is extended by banks, this revealed preference for PSL
lending suggests that the constraint is less binding, and vice versa.
Figure 8 shows that the pattern of excess PSL delinquency propensities trends upwards
but also roughly tracks the tightness of the PSL constraint. During the late 1990s, excess
delinquency propensities were declining as the PSL constraint became less binding, while
during the 2000s excess delinquency propensities trended up as rising house prices tightened
17the PSL constraint. To interpret these results, one should keep in mind two points. First,
results for the last few years of the sample period may be distorted by the fact that recent
loans may not yet have experienced delinquencies by the end of the sample period. Second,
as Table 4 shows, while still substantial, PSL-qualifying loans are a smaller fraction of the
mortgage book in the late 2000s.
Nevertheless, we do conclude that there is substantial evidence that small subsidized loans
have delinquency risk over and above larger unsubsidized loans which cannot be accounted for
by their interest rates. This e⁄ect appears to vary with the tightness of the PSL constraint,
although overall, the excess default propensities appear to have been increasing over time.
4.2 Change in the Classi￿cation of Non-Performing Assets
The discussion on regulation earlier noted another relevant change that took place over the
sample period that we consider: on March 31, 2004 for banks, and March 31, 2005 for HFCs,
the classi￿cation of ￿non-performing asset￿(or NPAs) was changed to 90 days past due from
the previous time period of 180 days past due. This regulatory reclassi￿cation of 90-day
delinquencies, and the associated implications of this change for provisioning requirements
may also have contributed to the unusually low delinquency rates seen in Figure 7 for more
recent loan cohorts. Of course, this also raises the important question of whether our
previous results using 90-day delinquencies are con￿rmed using data on 180-day delinquencies
￿a plausible model of behavior is that a mortgage provider might care more about ￿o¢ cial￿
NPAs (rather than delinquencies of a shorter term than the regulatory minimum) as these
have tangible balance sheet implications. Another important question that arises here is
whether the regulatory re-classi￿cation of NPAs had other impacts on behavior such as an
increased emphasis on monitoring shorter-term delinquencies (say 30 days past due), as any
reduction in the minimum delinquency period might be expected to feed through to the
earlier monitoring of mortgage default risk.
To answer the ￿rst of these questions, we re-estimate the model with 180-day delinquen-
cies on the left-hand side replacing 90-day delinquencies. The online empirical appendix
18to the paper shows that while, as we might have expected, the average delinquency rate is
lower when we consider 180-day delinquencies, the pattern of the cohort-time ￿xed e⁄ects
is consistent with that found using 90-day loans. This provides reassurance that our ear-
lier results are not simply driven by the use of a variable that is perhaps less immediately
important (prior to 2004-5) to the mortgage provider.
To answer the second question, we evaluate the expected loss given a delinquency before
and after the regulatory reclassi￿cation. This expected loss is the product of the proba-
bility of experiencing a delinquency and the loss given delinquency. Table 6 looks at the
￿rst of these two elements, computing transition probabilities of loans that hit the 30-day
delinquency threshold to the 90-day delinquency mark, as well as the transition probability
of 90-day delinquencies to the 180-day delinquent mark. The table shows that across the
entire sample period, 22.7% (22.8%) of 30-day (90-day) delinquent loans eventually become
90 days (180 days) delinquent.
As we are unable to publicly identify whether the mortgage provider is a bank or an HFC,
we use the earlier RBI implementation date of 31 March 2004 as the date of the regulatory
change, to cover all possibilities. When we look separately at the pre-April 2004 period
for the 30-day delinquencies, the transition probability is 29%, which is almost twice as
high as the post-March 2004 transition probability of 14.9%, and the reduction, of 14.1% is
highly statistically signi￿cant. Clearly, following the change in the de￿nition of NPAs to the
shorter 90-day limit, the mortgage provider substantially reduced this transition probability,
potentially by exerting e⁄ort to pursue borrowers more aggressively. The 90-day to 180-day
transition probability also reduces following the 2004 reclassi￿cation, but by a much smaller
2.3%, suggesting that once the loan becomes classi￿ed as an NPA, there are relatively fewer
incentives to take action. Another possibility, of course, is that the loans reaching the 90-day
delinquency mark are simply very di¢ cult to collect on despite exertions of e⁄ort.6
6It is also worth noting here that the 2002 implementation of SARFAESI, described above, allowed for
easier restructuring and repossession of delinquent loans. However the small change in the 90-180 day
transition probability despite this regulatory change mirrors the insigni￿cant post-SARFAESI change in the
￿CID debt collection rate that we de￿ne and analyze below. These results suggest that at least for housing
loans, this particular regulatory change may not have had very large e⁄ects.
19To better understand the magnitude of loss given delinquency, we acquire a sample of
10,000 loans from the total population of loans. As our focus is to understand the determi-
nants of mortgage risk, we randomly sample 2,500 ￿xed-rate and 2,500 variable-rate loans
from the set of 90-day delinquent loans, and a further 2,500 ￿xed-rate and 2,500 variable-rate
loans from the set of loans that do not experience a 90-day delinquency. In each sub-sample
of 2,500 loans, we further ensure that we sample an equal number (1,250) from the early
period in the data (disbursed prior to January 2000) and the later period (disbursed between
January 2000 and December 2004). The online empirical appendix (Campbell, Ramadorai,
and Ranish 2012) veri￿es that this 10,000 loan sample has statistically indistinguishable
characteristics from the population of loans from which we draw. For each one of these
10,000 loans, we are able to track the full payment history over time, as well as deviations
from contracted repayments. We can compute the latter as we are also given the equated
monthly installment (EMI) for each of these loans in each month, which is the expected
monthly principal repayment plus interest amount. We ensure that we weight any measures
constructed using this sample, so that they are re￿ ective of the larger population of loans
from which the sampling occurred.
For each loan in the sample, we construct a measure of losses accrued over time. To do
so, we accumulate payments and EMI over time, and compute the ￿cumulative installment
de￿cit￿(or CID) as Min(0, cumulative payment-cumulative EMI)/EMI. This measure takes
the value of zero if monthly payments exceed or equal the EMI, and is negative otherwise,
indicating when borrowers are in arrears. The cumulation ensures that if overpayments are
made to redress arrears, these are allowed to push the measure towards zero. The division
by EMI puts the cumulative installment de￿cit into units of required monthly payments.
Figure 9 plots the CID measure around 30-day delinquencies, before and after the regu-
latory change to the de￿nition of NPAs. The measure is cross-sectionally demeaned by both
cohort-year and calendar-year, to ensure that we are not picking up cohort or macroeconomic
e⁄ects. In both panels of Figure 9, date 0 is the ￿rst date that the loan is declared 30-days
delinquent (values below 1 are possible because of the cross-sectional demeaning). The top
panel shows that prior to the change in the regulatory de￿nition of NPAs, loans declared
2030-days delinquent on average in￿ icted a cost on the mortgage provider of roughly 1.2 EMIs
after a year. Post-March 2004, there is a substantial recovery in this number, with such
30-delinquent loans roughly 0.2 EMIs delinquent 12 months later. The bottom panel of the
￿gure shows that this change in the behavior of the CID after the regulatory rede￿nition of
NPAs is highly statistically signi￿cant.
We undertake this analysis more formally by estimating how changes in the CID vary
following a 30-day delinquency, but prior to hitting the 90-day threshold, both before and
after the regulatory rede￿nition of the NPA period. To do so, we estimate expected debt
collection rates ￿changes in the CID ￿as a polynomial function of the level of the CID
prior to the 90-day delinquency mark (i.e., a CID level of ￿3), allowing for a jump in the
rate at the 90-day delinquency mark, and modelled as a linear function of the CID beyond
the 90-day delinquency mark. As before, we include time- and cohort-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects
during estimation to ensure that we are not merely picking up some of the broader changes
detected earlier in the regulatory and macroeconomic environment.
Figure 10 shows how the estimated debt collection rate varies before and after the 90-
day delinquency threshold, before and after the regulatory rede￿nition of NPAs in March
2004. The ￿gure clearly reveals that following the regulatory rede￿nition of NPAs, the debt
collection rate prior to hitting the 90-day mark increased substantially relative to the pre-
regulatory change period, with a signi￿cant discontinuity at the 90-day threshold, where the
debt collection rate falls sharply.7 We also consider whether the introduction of SARFAESI
had any signi￿cant impacts on the ability to collect on debts, and ￿nd that while there is
a mild increase in the pre-90 day debt collection rate, it is dwarfed by the change following
the NPA rede￿nition (moreover, the small discontinuity evident in this line at the 90-day
mark is statistically insigni￿cant).
While these changes to debt collection rates are clearly evident in the data, one potential
worry is that the rede￿nition of NPAs from 180 to 90 days simply shifted the inevitable
7The increase in the debt collection rate prior to the 90-day delinquency mark, and the discontinuity
at that mark are both economically and statistically signi￿cant. The online empirical appendix plots
the di⁄erence between the pre- and post- NPA rede￿nition debt collection rates with associated bootstrap
con￿dence intervals.
21recovery of cash from delinquent borrowers by the 90-day di⁄erence between these two dates.
In other words, perhaps the change merely provided a time-value improvement in the net
cash ￿ ows of the mortgage provider, but no more substantial impacts.
To address this question, Figure 11 shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
the change in the CID (time- and cohort-demeaned) in the year following the ￿rst 30 day
delinquency. This CDF is plotted for three time periods, namely, January 1995 to June
2002, when SARFAESI was ￿rst implemented; July 2002 to March 2004, the date of the
rede￿nition of NPAs; and post-April 2004 until the end of the sample period in 2010. We
plot the ￿gure on a log scale to focus attention on the very worst cases (i.e., those loans with
the greatest degradation in CID over the year following the date of ￿rst 30-day delinquency),
as these loans are the most likely candidates for a complete write-o⁄.
The ￿gure shows that the post-NPA rede￿nition CDF ￿rst-order stochastically dominates
both the pre- and post-SARFAESI CDFs, showing a substantial reduction in the incidence
of high degradation in the CID. While SARFAESI appears to have had some bene￿cial
impacts for the very worst cases, this is dwarfed by the large impact of the NPA rede￿nition.
These substantial impacts on eventual bad debts of this regulatory rede￿nition are striking,
as it appears that there are important real bene￿ts to incentivizing mortgage providers to
detect and take early action on delinquencies.
Taken together, a simple change in the regulatory de￿nition of NPAs to a shorter length
of delinquency appears to have generated signi￿cant impacts on the expected loss given
delinquency of the mortgage provider. The impacts appear to be felt in reductions in the
probability of delinquency, as well as in the eventual loss given delinquency, and strongly
suggest a signi￿cant change in mortgage provider behavior in relation to borrowers in arrears.
While it is di¢ cult to generalize ￿ndings from one country, these results do suggest that
even seemingly innocuous changes in regulatory de￿nitions can have important impacts on
mortgage risk.
225 Conclusion
The Indian regulatory and macroeconomic environment has changed dramatically during
the last two decades. A fast-developing housing ￿nance system has coped with signi￿cant
variation in default rates and interest rates, and regulatory changes in the incentives to
originate mortgages in general, and small loans in particular. We have presented evidence
that regulation may have contributed to a surge in delinquencies during the early 2000s, that
subsidies for low-cost housing distorted the e¢ cient markets relationship between interest
rates and subsequent delinquencies, and that changes to the de￿nition of non-performing
assets impacted behavior in response to early evidence of payment delinquencies. Our paper
contributes to the growing body of literature on the impacts of regulators and regulatory
norms on risks in ￿nancial markets.
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Table 1: Indian Macroeconomic Statistics - 1985 through 2010
Real GDP and CPI Inflation are computed as the difference in levels as of the end of the given calendar year.
Interest rates (government yields and prime rate) are computed as the average across all days (ten year
government yield series) or month-ends (one year government yield and prime rate series) in each calendar year.
Aggregate real home price appreciation is computed as follows. First, nominal home price appreciation is
computed by loan origination location as the change in annual median home value for loans originated in that
location. Aggregate nominal home price appreciation is then computed from the loan origination location home
price appreciation using the number of loans disbursed by location as weights. The series is converted from
nominal to real using All India CPI inflation reported by the World Bank. This method of computation is robust


































1985 5.23% 5.56% 8.98% 16.50%
1986 4.77% 8.73% 9.80% 16.50%
1987 3.96% 8.80% 10.15% 16.50%
1988 9.64% 9.89% 10.66% 16.50%
1989 5.95% 6.16% 11.59% 16.50%
1990 5.53% 8.97% 12.46% 16.50%
1991 1.06% 13.87% 12.88% 17.88%
1992 5.48% 11.79% 13.61% 18.92%
1993 4.77% -6.90% 6.36% 13.21% 16.25%
1994 6.65% 1.07% 10.21% 10.00% 13.44% 15.00%
1995 7.57% 1.39% 10.22% 12.48% 13.85% 15.50%
1996 7.56% 2.57% 8.98% 12.49% 14.03% 15.96%
1997 4.05% 5.62% 7.16% 9.01% 12.74% 13.83%
1998 6.19% -5.27% 13.23% 8.95% 12.59% 13.54%
1999 7.39% 5.65% 4.67% 10.26% 12.28% 12.54%
2000 4.03% 6.96% 4.01% 10.00% 11.51% 12.25%
2001 5.22% 3.17% 3.68% 8.06% 10.01% 12.50%
2002 3.77% 1.68% 4.39% 6.19% 7.67% 12.00%
2003 8.37% 14.99% 3.81% 5.05% 6.16% 11.46%
2004 8.28% 21.61% 3.77% 4.93% 6.46% 10.92%
2005 9.32% 20.26% 4.25% 5.75% 7.50% 10.75%
2006 9.27% 19.01% 5.80% 6.78% 8.19% 11.19%
2007 9.82% 21.53% 6.37% 7.59% 8.50% 13.02%
2008 4.93% 9.96% 8.35% 7.98% 8.66% 13.31%
2009 9.10% 0.09% 10.88% 4.45% 7.66% 12.19%
2010 8.81% -1.38% 10.00% 5.98% 8.45% 11.00%29
Table 2: Summary Statistics on Loan Characteristics by Disbursal Year
This table provides year wise means (Panel A) and standard deviations (Panel B) of important characteristics for the more
than 1.2 million mortgage loans disbursed by the lender. Cohort delinquency rates are computed as the annual probability
that an outstanding and not-yet-90-day-delinquent loan experiences a 90 day delinquency. This probability is computed
separately for each disbursal-year cohort and calendar year. The delinquency rate below represents the time-series average
across calendar year estimates for each disbursal-year cohort. Statistics for fixed rate disbursals are removed for the years
2008 through 2010, as fixed rate disbursals account for well under one percent of disbursals (by count or value) in each of
these years. Similarly, cohort 90-day delinquency rate is omitted for loans disbursed after 2007 as these loans have not been
around long enough to reliably estimate a delinquency rate.
A: Cross-Sectional Means
Initial Interest Rate Loan Term (Years) Loan-Cost Ratio Loan-Income Ratio Cohort 90-Day Delinquency Rate
Variable Fixed Variable Fixed Variable Fixed Variable Fixed Variable Fixed
1995 15.22% 15.00% 13.96 11.66 0.58 0.54 3.73 3.52 1.70% 2.27%
1996 16.39% 16.14% 13.21 10.89 0.57 0.54 3.69 3.45 1.98% 2.56%
1997 15.54% 15.25% 13.18 10.38 0.58 0.55 3.69 3.38 1.76% 2.79%
1998 14.45% 14.09% 13.08 10.06 0.61 0.57 3.67 3.28 1.84% 3.12%
1999 13.58% 13.39% 12.88 10.63 0.64 0.61 3.62 3.31 1.78% 4.38%
2000 12.58% 12.83% 12.95 10.55 0.67 0.67 3.58 3.20 2.13% 4.58%
2001 11.78% 11.76% 12.72 10.23 0.68 0.64 3.56 3.23 2.16% 5.27%
2002 10.92% 10.82% 13.15 10.03 0.70 0.64 3.49 3.21 2.53% 4.63%
2003 10.68% 9.41% 12.88 12.76 0.72 0.65 3.45 3.54 2.36% 2.20%
2004 10.82% 8.13% 14.07 15.13 0.73 0.71 3.65 3.75 2.18% 0.91%
2005 10.42% 8.83% 15.16 15.17 0.74 0.69 3.75 3.72 1.75% 1.26%
2006 10.85% 10.45% 15.23 15.59 0.73 0.70 3.74 3.69 1.53% 1.12%
2007 11.03% 12.26% 15.03 14.68 0.73 0.68 3.75 3.58 1.18% 1.43%
2008 10.79% 15.38 0.72 3.78
2009 9.51% 14.31 0.71 3.72
2010 8.39% 15.59 0.73 3.84
B: Cross-Sectional Standard Deviations
Initial Interest Rate Loan Term (Years) Loan-Cost Ratio Loan-Income Ratio
Variable Fixed Variable Fixed Variable Fixed Variable Fixed
1995 0.94% 1.13% 2.51 4.24 0.18 0.20 0.47 0.71
1996 1.28% 1.53% 2.73 4.26 0.18 0.20 0.49 0.74
1997 0.84% 1.22% 2.72 4.49 0.18 0.20 0.51 0.83
1998 0.71% 1.09% 2.81 4.69 0.18 0.20 0.51 0.86
1999 0.51% 0.77% 3.00 4.52 0.18 0.19 0.52 0.80
2000 1.21% 0.85% 3.61 4.57 0.18 0.19 0.57 0.85
2001 1.06% 0.97% 3.97 4.56 0.18 0.24 0.61 0.83
2002 1.46% 0.92% 4.43 4.63 0.19 0.24 0.70 0.81
2003 2.08% 0.89% 4.85 4.77 0.19 0.26 0.78 0.67
2004 2.04% 0.60% 4.97 4.55 0.18 0.21 0.72 0.59
2005 1.73% 0.48% 4.92 4.52 0.18 0.22 0.68 0.60
2006 1.24% 0.76% 4.95 4.48 0.18 0.22 0.70 0.63
2007 0.67% 1.00% 4.41 4.78 0.18 0.23 0.69 0.71
2008 0.59% 4.57 0.18 0.70
2009 0.77% 5.00 0.18 0.72
2010 0.37% 4.55 0.17 0.6430
Table 3: Delinquency Model
This table presents coefficient estimates and standard errors from estimates of equation (1) in the paper. The
estimation takes place in two stages. First, cross-sectional estimates are produced for each year. Coefficients
below are produced from the cross-sectional estimates by classical minimum distance. Standard errors are
given in italics below the corresponding coefficients, and are computed by bootstrapping calendar years.
Coefficients that are statistically significant at a 5% two-sided level are in bold type. The null hypothesis is
that the macroeconomic effects equal one and all other coefficients equal zero. All coefficients (except
macroeconomic effects Zt) and associated standard errors are multiplied by 100 for readability.
Variable Rate Fixed Rate
A: Loan and Borrower Characteristics
Loan Characteristics:
Initial Interest Rate 0.418 0.378
0.041 0.054
Change in One-Year Government Bond Yield Since Disbursal 0.132
0.065
Regional Log Home Price Appreciation Since Disbursal -0.809 -2.484
0.411 0.738
Log Loan to Income Ratio (winsorized at 1st, 99th) 0.605 1.227
0.081 0.064
Log Loan to Cost Ratio 1.281 2.720
0.092 0.135
Dummy: Usually Paid by Salary Deduction -1.731 -3.021
0.117 0.161
Dummy: Loan administered through employers -0.279 -0.385
0.069 0.190
Dummy: Loan is a Refinancing 0.475 0.161
0.099 0.151
Dummy: Loan is for a Home Extension -0.178 -0.392
0.044 0.098
Dummy: Loan is for a Home Improvement 0.335 0.384
0.090 0.155
Dummy: Tranched Issuance -0.558 -0.279
0.151 0.470
Dummy: 6 to 10 Year Loan 0.167 1.129
0.064 0.198
Dummy: 11 to 15 Year Loan 0.661 1.727
0.084 0.240
Dummy: 16 Year+ Loan 1.460 1.604
0.164 0.212
Dummy: Year of Loan Issuance -2.478 -3.903
0.148 0.351
Dummy: Disbursed Within 12 Months of State Election -0.015 0.038
0.054 0.098
Piecewise-Linear Loan Size Controls
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Variable Rate Fixed Rate
Borrower Characteristics:
Log Number of Dependents -0.114 0.225
0.046 0.066
Male Borrower 0.182 0.492
0.027 0.059
Married Borrower 0.042 0.149
0.042 0.091
Borrower age 36-45 0.080 0.116
0.013 0.059
Age 46 and up 0.227 0.221
0.044 0.075
Dummy: Repeat Borrower 0.425 0.850
0.117 0.135
Dummy: Qualification Missing or Unidentified -0.125 -0.142
0.068 0.084
Dummy: HSC Equivalent -0.396 -0.857
0.074 0.082
Dummy: BA Equivalent -0.633 -1.241
0.104 0.089
Dummy: Post-Grad Equivalent -1.016 -1.796
0.098 0.109
Dummy: Finance-Related Qualification 0.177 0.209
0.028 0.064
Cohort Fixed Effects? Yes, Appendix Table A1
Annual Macroeconomic Effects? Yes, Appendix Table A1
21 Branch Dummies? Yes
Monthly Fixed Effects? Yes32
Table 4: Share of Loan Disbursals Above and Below Priority Sector Lending (PSL) Threshold Values
The share of loan disbursals above and below the PSL threshold and 0.5 times the PSL threshold are given as the share of the total value of loans disbursed in the given year. The PSL threshold
levels are sporadically reset (October 22, 1997, October 29, 1999, April 29, 2003, October 26, 2004, and July 2, 2007 are reset dates between 1995 and 2010). The regulatory source documents
are detailed in the online regulatory appendix. The distribution of fixed rate mortgage issuances after 2007 is not shown due to the limited extent of fixed rate lending in these years.
Variable Rate Share of Disbursals Variable Rate Mortgages Fixed Rate Mortgages
By Count By Value Above PSL Threshold Below PSL Threshold Below 0.5X PSL Threshold Above PSL Threshold Below PSL Threshold Below 0.5X PSL Threshold
1995 37.86% 42.98% 31.60% 68.40% 30.29% 29.01% 70.99% 37.78%
1996 47.45% 51.78% 36.95% 63.05% 27.07% 35.89% 64.11% 32.08%
1997 55.29% 60.84% 40.09% 59.91% 24.43% 38.27% 61.73% 30.39%
1998 59.04% 66.78% 26.67% 73.33% 40.06% 20.91% 79.09% 49.65%
1999 65.55% 71.32% 27.79% 72.21% 37.43% 21.80% 78.20% 45.77%
2000 75.70% 81.65% 23.36% 76.64% 47.66% 16.58% 83.42% 59.91%
2001 75.32% 82.31% 28.05% 71.95% 42.50% 17.49% 82.51% 61.95%
2002 84.40% 89.83% 32.52% 67.48% 39.23% 15.49% 84.51% 64.97%
2003 94.14% 94.16% 34.44% 65.56% 38.51% 34.88% 65.12% 40.57%
2004 84.51% 79.97% 35.35% 64.65% 34.28% 51.60% 48.40% 21.43%
2005 90.40% 92.09% 37.43% 62.57% 33.57% 24.81% 75.19% 45.40%
2006 90.44% 92.87% 56.03% 43.97% 21.21% 35.09% 64.91% 34.43%
2007 95.76% 97.72% 59.76% 40.24% 17.10% 35.61% 64.39% 39.08%
2008 99.44% 99.80% 60.32% 39.68% 15.53%
2009 99.87% 99.97% 64.58% 35.42% 13.19%
2010 99.97% 99.99% 66.72% 33.28% 9.69%33
Table 5: Delinquency Model With Cohort X Size Effects
This table presents coefficient estimates and standard errors from estimates of
equation (1) in the paper, modified to include interactions between size dummies and
cohort effects. See notes to Table 3 for a brief description of the estimation procedure
and control variables. Standard errors are given in italics below the corresponding
coefficients, and are computed by bootstrapping calendar years. The null hypothesis
is that all unconditional averages, cohort-specific, and size effects are zero.
Coefficients are in bold type where this null is rejected at a 95% two-sided
confidence level. Coefficients and associated standard errors are multiplied by 100









Effect for Loans Below 0.5
X PSL Threshold





1995 -0.288 -0.350 -0.383
0.367 0.281 0.110
1996 -0.439 -0.269 -0.480
0.332 0.111 0.104
1997 -0.940 -0.253 -0.325
0.302 0.083 0.069
1998 -0.602 -0.368 -0.097
0.276 0.119 0.081
1999 -0.352 -0.112 -0.154
0.139 0.063 0.084
2000 0.555 -0.386 -0.205
0.102 0.085 0.105
2001 0.442 -0.214 -0.070
0.172 0.096 0.097
2002 0.859 0.213 -0.212
0.167 0.096 0.127
2003 0.817 0.294 -0.135
0.238 0.174 0.236
2004 0.213 0.398 0.292
0.201 0.133 0.298
2005 -0.499 0.323 0.920
0.286 0.169 0.285
2006 -0.539 0.360 0.675
0.301 0.122 0.262
2007 -0.553 0.337 0.470
0.332 0.189 0.236
2008 -0.205 0.143 0.162
0.382 0.101 0.226
2009 0.217 0.039 -0.233
0.651 0.134 0.116
2010 1.314 -0.154 -0.224
0.703 0.028 0.056
Loan and Borrower Characteristics? Yes, Same as Table 4
Annual Macroeconomic Effects? Yes
21 Branch Dummies? Yes
Monthly Fixed Effects? Yes34
Table 5: Delinquency Model With Cohort X Size Effects (Contd.)
Panel B: Fixed rate mortgages. Cohort effects from 2008 through 2010 are ignored as
the limited number of fixed rate issuances in these years makes estimation of









Effect for Loans Below 0.5
X PSL Threshold





1995 -1.103 -0.056 -0.200
0.805 0.299 0.224
1996 -0.816 -0.186 -0.020
0.737 0.297 0.283
1997 -0.591 -0.272 -0.150
0.706 0.195 0.209
1998 -0.088 -0.582 -0.202
0.734 0.393 0.184
1999 0.214 -0.548 -0.053
0.667 0.168 0.294
2000 0.179 0.216 0.025
0.587 0.401 0.198
2001 1.758 -0.242 -0.055
0.601 0.498 0.451
2002 2.077 0.513 0.089
1.129 0.787 0.577
2003 0.773 0.318 0.048
0.772 0.261 0.548
2004 -0.167 0.522 -0.534
0.820 0.291 0.288
2005 -0.709 0.217 0.664
0.760 0.184 0.507
2006 -0.928 0.165 0.145
0.732 0.244 0.518
2007 -0.599 -0.066 0.244
0.676 0.496 0.788
Loan and Borrower Characteristics? Yes, Same as Table 4
Annual Macroeconomic Effects? Yes
21 Branch Dummies? Yes
Monthly Fixed Effects? Yes35
Table 6: Probability of Transition to Later Stage of Delinquency
This table presents the probability that initial 30 and 90 day mortgage delinquencies become 90 and 180 day
mortgage delinquencies respectively within six months following the initial delinquency. This transition
probability is first computed for all loans with initial delinquencies in a given month, and the probabilities
shown below are the time-series average of these monthly cross-sectional estimates, where the average is taken
over the indicated time periods. Standard errors are given in italics and constructed by bootstrapping from the
population of monthly cross-sectional estimates from each time period indicated. All coefficients are highly
statistically significant.
Probability of 30 day
Delinquency
Transitioning to 90 day
Delinquency




Month Relative Value SE Value SE
For Initial Delinquencies Occurring:
All Months (Jan 1996-Dec 2010) 22.7% 0.3% 22.8% 0.4%
Jan 1996-Mar 2004 (180 day NPA Regime) 29.0% 0.5% 23.9% 0.6%
April 2004-Dec 2010 (90 day NPA Regime) 14.9% 0.4% 21.6% 0.6%
Difference Around April 2004 -14.1% 0.7% -2.3% 0.9%Notes: Regional (north, south, east, west, central) and all India home price appreciation are constructed as disbursal
home price appreciation by loan origination location. Appreciation by loan origination location is computed as the change in
home value corresponding to loans disbursed in that location. This method of computation i
locations with differing housing costs. CPI figures used for adjustment are from the World Bank.
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Regional (north, south, east, west, central) and all India home price appreciation are constructed as disbursal
home price appreciation by loan origination location. Appreciation by loan origination location is computed as the change in
home value corresponding to loans disbursed in that location. This method of computation is robust to shifts in loan origination between
locations with differing housing costs. CPI figures used for adjustment are from the World Bank.
Regional (north, south, east, west, central) and all India home price appreciation are constructed as disbursal count weighted averages of
home price appreciation by loan origination location. Appreciation by loan origination location is computed as the change in annual median
s robust to shifts in loan origination between37Notes: Seasonal adjustments are computed by regressing log quarterly 90 day delinquency rates (for all ou
mortgages) on a set of year and calendar quarter dummies. The calendar quarter dummies from the log default rate regressions
exponentiated, normalized to one, and are used as scaling factors to seasonally
delinquency rates (DEFQ) are annualized by the transformation 1
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Seasonal adjustments are computed by regressing log quarterly 90 day delinquency rates (for all ou
mortgages) on a set of year and calendar quarter dummies. The calendar quarter dummies from the log default rate regressions
exponentiated, normalized to one, and are used as scaling factors to seasonally-adjust the quarterly delinquency rates. The resulting quarterly
delinquency rates (DEFQ) are annualized by the transformation 1-(1-DEFQ)
4.
Seasonal adjustments are computed by regressing log quarterly 90 day delinquency rates (for all outstanding fixed or variable rate
mortgages) on a set of year and calendar quarter dummies. The calendar quarter dummies from the log default rate regressions are
rterly delinquency rates. The resulting quarterlyFigure
Notes: This figure summarizes regulation affecting mortgage lending in India, with the top half representing the form of regulations
bottom half representing the form of regulations affecting housing finance companies (HFCs). The solid bar
programs affecting mortgage lending by both banks and HFCs. A division of regulations is drawn in 2001 (separating "first" an
when changing risk weights became a primary means
regulatory appendix
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igure 4: Timeline of Indian Mortgage Regulation
This figure summarizes regulation affecting mortgage lending in India, with the top half representing the form of regulations
bottom half representing the form of regulations affecting housing finance companies (HFCs). The solid bars in the middle section represent the timeline of
programs affecting mortgage lending by both banks and HFCs. A division of regulations is drawn in 2001 (separating "first" an
when changing risk weights became a primary means of banking regulation in India. For further details on Indian mortgage regulation, see the
This figure summarizes regulation affecting mortgage lending in India, with the top half representing the form of regulations affecting banks and the
s in the middle section represent the timeline of
programs affecting mortgage lending by both banks and HFCs. A division of regulations is drawn in 2001 (separating "first" and "second" periods) as that is
of banking regulation in India. For further details on Indian mortgage regulation, see the onlineNotes: Real GDP growth is from the World Bank. Average real growth in corporate sales, fixed assets, and net worth is the average of
are taken from the Prowess database. CPI inflation (from the World Bank) is subtracted from this series. The issuance weighte
of the fixed rate and variable rate macroeconomic effects Z
mortgage loans disbursed that are fixed or variable rate. All variables plotted are standardized.
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Real GDP growth is from the World Bank. Average real growth in corporate sales, fixed assets, and net worth is the average of
are taken from the Prowess database. CPI inflation (from the World Bank) is subtracted from this series. The issuance weighted average macro effect is the weighted average
mic effects Zt estimated in the delinquency model (Equation 1), where the weights are equal to the fraction of the total value of
mortgage loans disbursed that are fixed or variable rate. All variables plotted are standardized.
Real GDP growth is from the World Bank. Average real growth in corporate sales, fixed assets, and net worth is the average of the three constituent time series, which
d average macro effect is the weighted average
estimated in the delinquency model (Equation 1), where the weights are equal to the fraction of the total value ofNotes: The plotted cohort effects are the sum of the cohort fixed effects (estimated from the delinquency model, Equation 1) and cohort average
fitted values on loan and borrower characteristics (detailed in Table 3). These effects describe each cohort's propensity tow
which is not explained by initial interest rates or macroeconomic conditions affecting delinquencies in all cohorts. The seri
average of the effects derived separately for variable and fixed rate mortgages, where the weights for a given
variable and fixed rate issuance for that cohort.
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effects are the sum of the cohort fixed effects (estimated from the delinquency model, Equation 1) and cohort average
fitted values on loan and borrower characteristics (detailed in Table 3). These effects describe each cohort's propensity tow
which is not explained by initial interest rates or macroeconomic conditions affecting delinquencies in all cohorts. The seri
average of the effects derived separately for variable and fixed rate mortgages, where the weights for a given year are equal to the share of
effects are the sum of the cohort fixed effects (estimated from the delinquency model, Equation 1) and cohort average
fitted values on loan and borrower characteristics (detailed in Table 3). These effects describe each cohort's propensity towards delinquency
which is not explained by initial interest rates or macroeconomic conditions affecting delinquencies in all cohorts. The series is a weighted
year are equal to the share ofNotes: The plotted cohort effects are a decomposition of the de
attributed to loan and borrower attributes (cohort average fitted values from the delinquency model) and (2) soft information
other cohort effects (cohort fixed effects in the delinquency model). The interest rate ceiling is a maximum interest rate that housing fina
allowed to pay to depositors. Risk weights are used to determine capital requirements for banks and HFCs, with hi
capital provisioning. The risk weight series is the average of the risk weights applicable to banks and HFCs lending where lo
such risk weights change in the middle of a year, each r
42
The plotted cohort effects are a decomposition of the de-meaned abnormal cohort delinquencies in Figure 6 into (1) hard information
attributed to loan and borrower attributes (cohort average fitted values from the delinquency model) and (2) soft information
fects (cohort fixed effects in the delinquency model). The interest rate ceiling is a maximum interest rate that housing fina
allowed to pay to depositors. Risk weights are used to determine capital requirements for banks and HFCs, with higher risk weight assets requiring greater
capital provisioning. The risk weight series is the average of the risk weights applicable to banks and HFCs lending where lo
such risk weights change in the middle of a year, each risk weight is weighted by the fraction of the year for which it was applicable.
abnormal cohort delinquencies in Figure 6 into (1) hard information - delinquencies
attributed to loan and borrower attributes (cohort average fitted values from the delinquency model) and (2) soft information - delinquencies attributed to
fects (cohort fixed effects in the delinquency model). The interest rate ceiling is a maximum interest rate that housing finance companies are
gher risk weight assets requiring greater
capital provisioning. The risk weight series is the average of the risk weights applicable to banks and HFCs lending where loan-to-value is below 0.75. Where
isk weight is weighted by the fraction of the year for which it was applicable.Notes: The issuance weighted average cohort delinquency effects are the weighted average of the fixed rate and variable rate excess
size fixed effects, where the weights are equal to the fraction of the total value of mortgage loans disbursed that are fixed
towards delinquency of smaller loans beyond the propensity of loans larger than the priority sector lending threshold in effect at the
PSL constraints equals minus the log home-price adjusted priority sector lending threshold, which is
priority sector (as properties are too expensive). The second proxy is the priority sector lending requirement (as a percenta
lending. Both proxies are plotted in standardized units. Priority sector lending thresholds are detailed in the online regula
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The issuance weighted average cohort delinquency effects are the weighted average of the fixed rate and variable rate excess cohort effects from the delinquency model
size fixed effects, where the weights are equal to the fraction of the total value of mortgage loans disbursed that are fixed or variable rate. These effects represent the incremental propensity
he propensity of loans larger than the priority sector lending threshold in effect at the time of the loan disbursal.
price adjusted priority sector lending threshold, which is a measure of the fraction of properties for which mortgages are unlikely to qualify as
priority sector (as properties are too expensive). The second proxy is the priority sector lending requirement (as a percentage of total credit) minus aggregate domestic
lending. Both proxies are plotted in standardized units. Priority sector lending thresholds are detailed in the online regulatory appendix.
cohort effects from the delinquency model using cohort X
or variable rate. These effects represent the incremental propensity
time of the loan disbursal. The first proxy for the tightness of
a measure of the fraction of properties for which mortgages are unlikely to qualify as
ge of total credit) minus aggregate domestic bank priority sectorNotes: Abnormal installment deficit is given by the estimated coefficients on time to delinquency (interacted with a post
changes in the cumulative installment deficit (value of delinquent installments in terms of ex
different pattern of abnormal installment deficits to emerge around delinquencies following the change in regulatory definiti
time and cohort fixed effects and is run separately for 30 and 90 day delinquencies. Top Panel: The cumulative installment deficit is the cumulative sum of the ab
installment deficits estimated from the model. Bottom Panel: The series shown is the difference in
time from the month of delinquency. The 90% confidence intervals shown are computed by
2004-2010.
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Abnormal installment deficit is given by the estimated coefficients on time to delinquency (interacted with a post-March 2004 dummy) from a regression predicting
changes in the cumulative installment deficit (value of delinquent installments in terms of expected monthly installments). The post-March 2004 dummy allows for a
different pattern of abnormal installment deficits to emerge around delinquencies following the change in regulatory definition of non-
run separately for 30 and 90 day delinquencies. Top Panel: The cumulative installment deficit is the cumulative sum of the ab
installment deficits estimated from the model. Bottom Panel: The series shown is the difference in the series plotted in the top panel accumulated backwards and forwards in
time from the month of delinquency. The 90% confidence intervals shown are computed by bootstrapping years of observations separately from the groups 1996
March 2004 dummy) from a regression predicting
March 2004 dummy allows for a
-performing assets. This model includes
run separately for 30 and 90 day delinquencies. Top Panel: The cumulative installment deficit is the cumulative sum of the abnormal
accumulated backwards and forwards in
ately from the groups 1996-2003 andNotes: The expected debt collection rates (ΔCID) plotted below are produced from least squares regressions which fit ΔCID as a set o
effects, and (3) if the observation is a loan within six months following a 30 da
nonlinear function of CID is a fourth degree polynomial for CID levels below three months (90 days) and linear beyond three m
occur at the three month horizon. Observations used for the regression are account
corresponding to each regression. Weights are used in the regression so that results
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The expected debt collection rates (ΔCID) plotted below are produced from least squares regressions which fit ΔCID as a set of (1) year fixed effects, (2) cohort fixed
effects, and (3) if the observation is a loan within six months following a 30 day delinquency, a nonlinear function of the current cumulative installment deficit (CID). The
nonlinear function of CID is a fourth degree polynomial for CID levels below three months (90 days) and linear beyond three months of delinquencies with a jump all
occur at the three month horizon. Observations used for the regression are account-days (from a sample of 10,000 mortgage loans) that occur within the time window
corresponding to each regression. Weights are used in the regression so that results are reflective of the larger population of loans from which the sampling occurred.
f (1) year fixed effects, (2) cohort fixed
y delinquency, a nonlinear function of the current cumulative installment deficit (CID). The
onths of delinquencies with a jump allowed to
days (from a sample of 10,000 mortgage loans) that occur within the time window
are reflective of the larger population of loans from which the sampling occurred.Notes: Changes in cumulative installment deficit (CID) over a one year period are regressed on (1) a set of dummies indicating if a
3,...,12 months ago, (2) cohort fixed effects, and (3) time fixed effects. These regressions are run separately for each of the thr
distribution functions plot the residual plus fitted value on the "12 months after
CDFs so that results are reflective of the larger population of loans from which the sample was drawn. For the roughly 10% of
the 30 day delinquency, the CID at the time of the loan's termination is used in the distribution.
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Changes in cumulative installment deficit (CID) over a one year period are regressed on (1) a set of dummies indicating if a 30 day delinquency first occurred 1, 2,
12 months ago, (2) cohort fixed effects, and (3) time fixed effects. These regressions are run separately for each of the three time periods indicated. The cumulative
distribution functions plot the residual plus fitted value on the "12 months after 30 day delinquency" dummy. Weights are used in the regressions and construction of the
CDFs so that results are reflective of the larger population of loans from which the sample was drawn. For the roughly 10% of loans which leave the books within a year
the 30 day delinquency, the CID at the time of the loan's termination is used in the distribution.
30 day delinquency first occurred 1, 2,
ee time periods indicated. The cumulative
30 day delinquency" dummy. Weights are used in the regressions and construction of the
loans which leave the books within a year of